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IS TORT LAW MALE?: FORESEEABILITY ANALYSIS AND
PROPERTY MANAGERS' LIABILITY FOR THIRD
PARTY RAPES OF RESIDENTS*
LESLIE BENDER**
WITH PERETrE LAWRENCE***
Recent feminist legal scholarship discloses how law is male both
on its face and as applied. In this article I illustrate one way tort law's
foreseeability doctrine is male "as applied." By claiming that tort law
in terms of foreseeability is "male as applied," I mean the tort con-
cept of foreseeability is broad and flexible enough to be inclusive of
male and female experiences, perspectives and concerns, but instead it
has been biased in its application. A benefit of a "law as applied"
feminist critique is that in the name of fairness, courts enlightened by
this analysis will be inspired to correct the naked biases and to pro-
ceed from more inclusive premises. Because we do not need to con-
vince the courts to change the doctrine, our arguments are easier. We
need only sensitize and educate the law appliers. 1 This article grew
out of a panel discussion between Justice Martha Craig Daughtrey of
the Tennesee Supreme Court and myself of one case, Doe v. Linder
Construction Co.,2 in which Justice Daughtrey had written a long dis-
sent. I use that case as the focus of my analysis here. The feminist
methodology I apply to unearth the male biases in Doe applies equally
to analyses of law in many other tort cases.
* © Copyright, 1994, by Leslie Bender. All rights reserved.
** Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. I dedicate this article to my aunt
and uncle, Leah and Stanley Elsas of Birmingham, Alabama.
This article is a development of the presentation I made at the "Is the Law Male?" panel for
the 1993 Annual American Bar Association Meeting in New York City, New York in August
1993. The panel, from which this symposium issue is drawn, was organized by the ABA Com-
mission on Women in the Profession and Professor Linda Hirshman. I would like to thank
Marena McPherson, Karen Berenbaum and Patsy Engelhard of the ABA Commission on Wo-
men along with Professor Hirshman for their vision and all the other panelists for a truly stimu-
lating and memorable event.
*** Research Assistant and second-year law student, College of Law, Syracuse University.
1. Justice Levine, in her special concurrence in Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498
N.W.2d 174, 189 (N.D. 1993), acknowledges the role of attorneys and clients in educating juries
and courts about the history and harms of sex discrimination in our society.
2. Doe v. Linder Constr. Co., 845 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn. 1992).
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As a second point, I give a short illustration of a way in which tort
doctrine "on its face," or "at its core," in its conceptual framework, 3 is
male in the Doe majority's analysis of the requirement of "site-specific
notice" of prior criminal activities in order to hold a property manager
liable for criminal assaults of residents by third parties. Convincing
courts to make changes using this kind of analysis is more difficult
because they actually have to articulate new or revised doctrines. Us-
ing a feminist analysis, I suggest a change in the doctrinal approach
that will more fairly represent the actual experiences and perspectives
of women as well as men in tort law.
THE MALE-BIASED MAJORITY OPINION IN DOE
Doe v. Linder Construction Co. considers the liability of property
managers or parties retaining residents' keys for rapes of residents
committed by third parties who obtain the keys from the property
managers. 4 The majority opinion in Doe, written by Tennessee
Supreme Court Chief Justice Reid, concludes that the trial court was
correct in throwing out Jane Doe's case at the summary judgment
stage because (1) her injury (rape) was not foreseeable and therefore
there was no duty to protect against its happening, (2) the defendants
had no notice that there was a need to protect against this kind of
criminal activity, and (3) the property managers' negligence was not
the proximate cause of the rape because the rapists' conduct was a
superseding intervening cause of harm.5 The majority characterizes
the situation as a "no duty" or nonfeasance case, resting much of its
argument on the idea that there is no duty to protect against third
party criminal assaults or key thefts which are unforeseeable. Justice
Daughtrey's powerful dissent responds to each of these issues. [The
factual background of the case, from the point of view of Justice
Daughtrey's dissent, is included in the Appendix to this article.] She
3. When I say that tort law is male on its face or at it's core, I mean in the language courts
use to articulate it, but also in the substance of the doctrine, concepts and analytical framework
used.
4. Doe, 845 S.W.2d at 175. Jane Doe was raped by two men who entered her house by
gaining possession of her key from the office of the builder-seller of her home. She identified
the rapists as workers employed by the builder-seller and they were convicted of the rapes. Jane
Doe then sued the builder-seller, the real estate agent and their employees for, among other
things, their negligence in handling her key and their failure to protect her from the foreseeable
harms of the keys getting into the wrong hands. The trial court granted summary judgment to
the defendants. Even though an intermediate appellate court reversed the summary judgment,
the state supreme court found four to one that summary judgment was appropriate. Justice
Daughtrey wrote the lone dissent.
5. The issue of negligent hiring was not preserved on appeal.
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does not argue that as a matter of law the defendants were negligent
and therefore liable, but only that this case should have gone to a jury.
Her arguments are crystal clear, well-researched, supported by ample
case law and scholarly authority, and are persuasive on the law.6 De-
parting from the majority's nonfeasance approach, Justice Daughtrey
characterizes the case as one of misfeasance, about the mishandling of
a house key, which is an affirmative action negligently done. She ad-
dresses the clear foreseeability of criminal conduct causing harm aris-
ing from the mishand!ing of a residence key and the substantial
judicial support across the country for imposing duties on those in
control of ingress to residences to act with reasonable care to protect
against third party criminal assaults. In addition, she adroitly shows
how a recent Tennessee precedent, McClenahan v. Cooley, supports
her conclusion that this case should go to a jury for findings on fore-
seeability and cause. 7 McClenahan was a case in which the same
members of the Tennessee Supreme Court a year earlier unanimously
held that it was a jury question whether a car owner should be liable
in tort to a widower whose pregnant wife and child were killed when
the owner left his keys in a car ignition resulting in car theft, a high-
speed chase with police down a busy street, and ultimately a fatal col-
lision with an oncoming car. As a matter of fact, arguments much like
those Justice Daughtrey made in Doe persuaded a Texas court of ap-
6. One of the serious points of disagreement between the majority and dissent is the appli-
cability by analogy of cases involving affirmative duties of landlords to provide adequate security
for their tenants. The majority finds the analogy wholly inapplicable, Doe, 845 S.W.2d at 177,
whereas the dissent finds the large body of cases and scholarship on a landlord's duty apposite
because of the similarity between a landlord's retention of control over the premises and this
defendant's retention of the key for repairs and control over access to the premises through the
key. Id. at 191-98 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). While I believe the analogy is quite useful and
carefully argued by the dissent, for purposes of this paper, I will show how the plaintiff ought to
have been permitted to go to trial based on other more traditional tort notions.
7. As Justice Daughtrey so ably highlights, the Doe majority's refusal to let this case get
past summary judgment is particularly unsettling in light of its decision a term earlier in McClen-
ahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. 1991), where the same court took a progressive stance by
letting the jury decide the foreseeability of intervening criminal activity. In McClenahan, the
court found that it was up to a jury to decide whether leaving a key in a car ignition, resulting in
the car being stolen, can result in liability of the car owner to a person injured by the negligent
driving of the car thief. Justice Daughtrey asks: If the foreseeability question about car thieves
and subsequent accidents arising from mishandling of car keys is a jury question, why isn't the
foreseeability of break-ins and rape based on mishandling of household keys a jury question?
Doe, 845 S.W.2d at 198-99 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). What is the difference between carelessly
leaving the keys accessible to a car thief or to a home burglar? The majority in Doe unsatisfacto-
rily declares, without explanation, "The difference in McClenahan and this case is that in Mc-
Clenahan the proof would support a finding of foreseeability and in this case it would not." Id. at
181. If the question is whether the defendant was careless or negligent, then that is a jury ques-
tion. Foreseeability is supposed to be a jury question. But the court understands this case to
turn on foreseeability and decides that as a matter of law this rape was not a foreseeable conse-
quence of mishandling of a resident's key.
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peals in February 1993 to affirm a $16 million verdict for Juli Bliskey
against her townhouse property manager for gross negligence in mis-
handling her key, conduct which resulted in the key being stolen and
used by a rapist.8
Yet, these same arguments failed to persuade the four other jus-
tices of the Tennessee Supreme Court. Why is that? What was at
stake in this case that impeded the majority from following its own
lead in McClenahan? Why did Justice Reid feel the need to write in
sarcastic, hostile tones about the "revolution" in tort law that would
result from letting this case go to a jury as the dissent suggests? 9 Why
did the court veer from the usual approach in summary judgment
cases of reading the facts favorably to the non-moving party and refus-
ing summary judgment where facts are in dispute? 10
8. Berry Property Management v. Bliskey, 850 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). The simi-
larities between Bliskey and Doe are remarkable. In Bliskey the management left plaintiff's key
labeled to her townhouse on an open pegboard in a locked office. They also left the lease infor-
mation files unlocked in the office. Id. at 651. Like in Doe, the rapist made an unauthorized
entry into the property management office, found the key, and used it to enter the plaintiff's
apartment in order to rape her. The jury and court in Bliskey found the defendant property
management grossly negligent in not specifically locking up the key (even though the property
management office was locked) and in labelling the key so that it was clearly identifiable which
house it opened. Bliskey, 850 S.W.2d at 651. In Bliskey there was the added negligence of
leaving the lease information unlocked, but since the rapist in Doe already knew that Jane Doe
was alone, this was not critical to his success. The essentially same conduct with respect to key
handling which was found grossly negligent in Bliskey was found not negligent as a matter of law
in Doe.
9. Doe, 845 S.W.2d at 176-77, 180.
10. The majority states that it is complying with the standard of review traditional in these
kinds of cases, but as Justice Daughtrey points out, they did not afford Jane Doe the benefit of
the law. Doe, 845 S.W.2d at 186-87 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). A careful reading of majority
and dissent opinions illustrates the differences in the perspective from which the facts are read.
The majority, contrary to rules about review of summary judgment motions, clearly read the
facts from the perspective of the defendants. But more is involved than just the weight or infer-
ences given to evidence as presented by each party. Something else is going on here.
Strong messages about the justices' personal understandings, points-of-view, and priorities
are revealed by the order and tone in which they relate the facts. In Justice Reid's section of his
opinion entitled "Facts," he begins with the stories of the defendants, Samuel Carpenter, Elwood
Carpenter, Pattie Rollins and Clinton Osborne. He discusses the construction company's rela-
tionship with the workers, how defendant Sam Carpenter came by the key to the model home,
defendant Clinton Osborne's coming onto the scene, and how Carpenter and Osborne got the
pass key. Id. at 175-76. Finally, in the last paragraph describing the facts, Reid says "He [Car-
penter] and Osborne then entered the plaintiffs house with the pass key and raped her. Both
men were convicted of the crime." Id.
Justice Daughtrey's presentation of the facts begins:
[T]he plaintiff was raped by two men, who surreptitiously entered the home where she
and her four-year-old son were sleeping on the night of October 9, 1986. After assault-
ing Doe, one of the men stole several pieces of jewelry from her bedroom and then
helped himself to food from her refrigerator while the second rape was being
committed.
Id. at 187 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). Daughtrey continues her description by explaining how
and why Doe purchased her home in this housing development, noting her dependence upon
claims of safety and good security. Id.
[Vol. 69:313
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Some might argue, although Reid did not develop this argument
in his majority opinion, that the court's vision was skewed by a fear of
potentially overwhelming costs to landowners, landlords, and property
managers." I think not. Were a court to find that it is a jury question
whether those in possession of a residence key could foresee some
third party acquiring the key to commit a criminal act against the resi-
dent, the cost or "burden of precaution" would be minimal. To avoid
liability, those taking responsibility for a residence key would have to
institute practices that safeguard keys from unauthorized use. At
most it involves locked key boxes, coded key systems, non-retention
of owner's keys, inventories of keys, sign-out sheets for those who
take keys, and the immediate changing of locks if a key is unac-
counted for or lost. Any simple cost-benefit analysis would run in
favor of such a minimum-cost solution over the tremendous individual
and social costs of rape, sexual assault, or any other property or per-
sonal injury crimes that might ensue from a mishandled residence key.
Others might contend that natural judicial conservatism pre-
vented the court from making this "revolutionary" move. Again, I
would have to disagree. If any move by the court had been "radical"
and a departure from precedent, it was the McClenahan decision the
year before. The court's willingness to unanimously broaden Tennes-
see's notions of proximate and intervening causes in 1991 militates
against the supposition that this court was motivated by its natural
conservativism and unflinching fidelity to precedent. A finding that
Doe's case presents a jury question is hardly "revolutionary," despite
Reid's assertions to the contrary, in light of Tennessee's own prece-
dents and two decades of opinions by other courts across the nation. 12
The court's sarcastic and loose use of the term "revolution," which
Justice Reid attributes to Justice Daughtrey's dissenting approach, is
especially disturbing when one realizes that the term was borrowed
from one commentator's 1984 assessment of the earlier decades' re-
sponses to landlord-tenant law. 13 Changes in law, even if they digress
from an historically set course, are hardly revolutionary in our current
11. Actually, Reid's opinion makes passing reference in its conclusion to the "unrealistic
burden" a finding of affirmative duty would place on contractors and other employers, Doe, 845
S.W.2d at 184, but never elaborates on what the burden of safeguarding keys would be.
In Bliskey, the Texas court found it relevant that the property management did not maintain
the keys in a "safe manner." A safe manner included keeping the resident's keys under a coding
system and in a locking metal box at a cost of approximately $30.00. Bliskey, 850 S.W.2d at 655-
57.
12. See cases and articles cited in Justice Daughtrey's dissent. Doe, 845 S.W.2d at 184-203.
13. Id. at 192 (citing Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law:
Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517 (1984)).
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day after two decades of court opinions and scholarship incorporating
their perspectives.
I would argue that the all male majority of the Tennessee
Supreme Court refused to let Jane Doe take her case to a jury, not
because of economics or controlling legal precedents or judicial con-
servatism, but because the justices' male-centered assumptions and
understandings of the issue of rape and its relation to law warped their
construction of the issue and their application of the law in this case.
The assumptions about and dynamics of rape and sexually motivated
violence in our culture are so powerful and subconscious or uncon-
scious that they bring male bias into the soul of legal judgments and
judicial wisdom unless overtly challenged. Feminist and pro-feminist
lawyers and judges must persuade courts to expose the wrongful as-
sumptions about rape contained in law and to confront the social in-
jury of sexual violence to women by developing legal strategies that
reduce those risks of harm. We must educate courts and lawmakers
about the prevalence of rape and its clear foreseeability in our (unfor-
tunately, still far too) patriarchal culture, while we disabuse courts of
their sex-biased assumptions and complicity in continued sexist op-
pression. Moreover, we must reform the law so that it clearly rein-
forces our collective responsibilities to end our rape culture and
prevent further harms to women.
I am outraged by how tort law treated Jane Doe, preventing her
from presenting her case to a jury. Jane Doe's case was unusual be-
cause she clearly identified the rapists, pursued a criminal prosecution,
and they were convicted in criminal court.14 When under those cir-
cumstances a rape victim is prevented from using our legal system to
seek compensation from parties she holds responsible for exposing
her to the threat of sexual violence in her own home, tort law fails us.
We must make certain that this never happens again this way. Justice
Daughtrey made a valiant effort to avoid this heinous result, but as
the only woman, she could not singularly dismantle the formidable bar
of sexism and bias on her court.
I emphasize again that neither Justice Daughtrey nor I am saying
that Jane Doe was entitled to a verdict as a matter of law. At this
point we are only arguing that tort law should afford her an opportu-
14. Ninety-eight percent of rape victims never see their attacker caught, tried, and impris-
oned according to a 1993 Senate Judiciary Committee Report. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 104TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE RESPONSE TO RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO
EQUAL JUSTICE (May 1993) [hereinafter THE RESPONSE TO RAPE].
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nity to persuade a jury of defendant's legal responsibility for her
harm.
FORESEEABILITY AS A CONCEPT IN TORT LAW
How could the majority of the Tennessee Supreme Court say that
Jane Doe's rape was not reasonably foreseeable and that the defend-
ants had no notice of the potential risk of harm? What kind of world
view would one have to have to believe that rape was not a reasonably
foreseeable risk of improper house key handling? To see the world
from this perspective, the viewer would have to be someone who does
not think or worry about the possibility of rape on a regular basis.
And more than that, the person with this world view would also have
to be ignorant of all the literature and reporting about the pervasive-
ness of rape, while buying into culturally based rape myths, the inac-
curacies of which have repeatedly been exposed. 15 Tort law cannot
continue to abide that ignorance or use that narrow perspective.
Those who apply and interpret tort law have a legal and moral obliga-
tion to incorporate the knowledge, experiences, and perspectives of
people who understand the pervasiveness and reality of sexual vio-
lence in our society.
Tort law imposes a duty to act with reasonable care to avoid fore-
seeable harms. Foreseeability is a pivotal concept in tort law because
both duty and proximate cause analyses often turn on it. 16 Certainly
this was true in the Doe case. The majority reasoned that criminal
conduct by a known party in obtaining the key was not reasonably
foreseeable, and therefore there was no duty to protect against it,
while simultaneously ruling that commission of rape of a resident by a
15. See, e.g., Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 979 (1993) (explaining and debunking myths about rape).
Surprisingly, even people with easy access to national statistics continue to show incredible
ignorance about the prevalence of rape. One example is the statement by Dr. Allen Beck, dep-
uty associate director of the Corrections Unit for the Bureau of Justice Statistics within the
Department of Justice, that "rape is a rare event, an infrequent crime." See Deborah Privitera,
Federal Study Suggests Rapists More Likely to Rape Again than Other Criminals, STATES NEWS
SERVICE, April 7, 1993. See also CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, PH.D., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 7 (1991) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT] (rape and attempted
rape are relatively rare crimes compared to robbery and assault, amounting to less than three
percent of all violent crime measured by the National Crime Survey). When so much evidence
shows that a large percentage of rapes go unreported, it seems irresponsible for government
statisticians to reach these conclusions based on admittedly flawed and inaccurate data. See infra
notes 24, 28.
16. William H. Hardie, Jr., Foreseeability: A Murky Crystal Ball for Predicting Liability, 23
CUMB. L. REV. 349 (1993) (carefully explaining the history and role of foreseeability in duty and
proximate cause analyses, but arguing against its continued use).
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person who unlawfully obtained possession of the resident's key from
the property manager was not foreseeable, and hence was a supersed-
ing intervening cause cutting off liability from the original key mishan-
dler. The dissent countered with arguments that there exists a duty to
protect against a resident's key ending up in the hands of thieves and
burglars, because burglary and theft are completely foreseeable re-
suits of key mishandling. She also concluded that because criminal
conduct resulting in harm following the theft of a house key is foresee-
able, key mishandling can be a proximate cause of the harms perpe-
trated by key thieves.
How can the concept of foreseeability encompass both the major-
ity's and dissent's very different understandings in this case? I think
that it cannot. The problem here, however, is not with the concept of
foreseeability itself, but that this central concept of foreseeability ends
up meaning "what is foreseeable to reasonable men," rather than
what it is supposed to mean, that is, "what is foreseeable to reasonable
people," a group that includes women and men with their differing
experiences in our society. It is not that the concept of foreseeability
is inevitably male or flawed, but in many cases the partiality of the
perspective traditionally employed to interpret or apply the concept of
foreseeability has not been exposed. Instead the perspective has mas-
queraded as universal or whole and undermined the fairness of tort
law.
The Doe case is a perfect illustration of a male-biased under-
standing of foreseeability interpreted to mean what men give atten-
tion to and focus on or protect against for their own well-being. Then
the men using this male-biased perspective generalize from their expe-
rience-based perceptions about who is owed a duty and whether ac-
tors are responsible for harms, implicitly believing that those same
things are what are or should be foreseeable and important for every-
one. The jurists who developed this technique did so thinking it was
equitable and just. Feminist lawyers must bring to these courts' atten-
tion data and stories about rape to explode the myths and alter the
law appliers' misconceptions. Only then can the law move closer to
the fairness it was designed to achieve for all who seek its justice, in-
cluding people whose perspectives and understandings were formerly
slighted by law's biases.
[Vol. 69:313
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FORESEEABILITY OF RAPE
How foreseeable is rape? Experts estimate that a woman has be-
tween a 1 in 5 and a 1 in 8 chance of being raped in her lifetime. 17 Dr.
Mary Koss et al.'s study of sexual violence against women determined
that 1 in 4 college women will be attacked by a rapist.' 8 The Senate
Judiciary Committee that year reported that every hour sixteen wo-
men confront rapists and a woman is raped every six minutes.' 9 The
Bureau of Justice, which uses a very narrow defLnition of rape, recites
the number of reported rapes exceeded one hundred thousand for the
first time in 1990.20 This figure represents a 6.3% increase in rapes in
one year, which was nearly three times greater than the yearly in-
crease of 2.2% in 1989.21 Even if we use the conservative estimate by
the Justice Department that almost half of rapes are reported, 22 that
still would mean over two hundred thousand rapes a year.23 Feminist
scholars estimate much higher numbers and rates.24 They would pre-
17. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 3 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter A
WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA] (The 1 in 5 figure is taken from Dr. Mary Koss, testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Aug. 29, 1990); the 1 in 8 figure is taken from NATIONAL
VICTIM CENTER AND THE CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT CENTER, MEDICAL
UNIV. OF S.C., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 2 (1992) [hereinafter RAPE IN
AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION]).
18. Violence Against Women: Vicitims of the System: Hearings on S.15 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 259-60 (1991) (statement of Dr. Leslie R. Wolf,
Executive Director, Center for Women Policy Studies, citing Dr. Mary P. Koss, et al., The Scope
of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample
of Higher Education Students, 55 J. OF CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162-70 (1987).
MARY P. Koss & MARY R. HARVEY, THE RAPE VICTIM: CLINICAL AND COMMUNITY INTERVEN-
TIONS 22-29 (2d ed. 1991) (breakdown of statistical research into groups); Diana E.H. Russell &
Nancy Howell, The Prevalence of Rape in the United States Revisited, 8 SIGNS 688, 694-95 (1983)
(forty-six percent of women will be victims of rape attacks); Allan G. Johnson, On the Prevalence
of Rape in the United States, 6 SIGNS 136, 144-45 (1980) (conservative estimate of 20-30% of
women between ages 12-70 will experience a rape attack-uses FBI statistics). Accord CATHA-
RINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 145-46 (Harv. U. Press,
1989).
19. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1990, S.
REP. No. 545, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 545].
20. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON VIO-
LENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE INCREASE OF RAPE IN AMERICA 1990, at 1-2 (1991) [hereinafter
THE INCREASE OF RAPE IN AMERICA 1990] (citing Bureau of Justice data).
21. Id. at 3.
22. DOJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 8 (estimating that forty-seven percent of nonstranger
rapes and fifty-seven percent of stranger rapes are reported to the police). This data does not
include rapes of children under 12 years old.
23. See THE INCREASE OF RAPE IN AMERICA 1990, supra note 20, at 28 (noting that the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Sourcebook on Criminal Justice Statistics (1989), recording a
1988 rape total of 127,000, has "extensive methodological flaws that all, including BJS, agree
result in a severe undercounting of victims").
24. Id. at 8, 28 (citing The Violence Against Women Act, 1991: Hearings on S.15 Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (The Senate Judiciary Committee not only
1993]
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dict between 683,00025 and well over two million rapes of women in
the U.S. each year,26 based on studies that reveal that only between
7% to 16% of rapes and attempted rapes are even reported.27 That
means that at least eighty-four percent are never reported and not
included in any of the police or government data. You cannot read
any city newspaper without learning of at least one rape report, and if
such a small percentage of rapes are ever reported, imagine what is
really happening. Newspapers recently have been reporting that rates
of violent crimes have dropped, except for rates of rape, which are
increasing.28 If you talk with workers at women's shelters, rape crises
centers, and university rape centers, the prevalence of this gender-
based violence 29 becomes even more apparent.30
A woman is ten times more likely to be raped than to die in a car
crash. 31 In light of this factual data, it seems clearly offensive to say
that any rape is "unforeseeable"-especially since tort law clearly un-
derstands car crashes to be foreseeable and requires caution to guard
against them.32 Even women who do not know these statistics are
accepted but included in their report Dr. Koss' statistics which concluded that less than 5% of
college women report rape to the police, and more than half of them never tell anyone of their
victimization. Also included was Koss' estimate that the number of women raped in 1986 was
fifteen times higher than officially reported in the National Crime Survey)).
25. RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 17, at 2 (but report recog-
nizes that this figure constitutes well less than half of the rapes reported in a year, because it did
not include rapes of young women and girls under eighteen or males of any age).
26. THE INCREASE OF RAPE IN AMERICA 1990, supra note 20, at 28 (citing The Violence
Against Women Act, 1991: Hearings on S. 15 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990) (statement of Dr. Mary Koss)).
27. THE RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra note 14, at 27 (citing RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO
THE NATION, supra note 17, at 6, indicating 16% report rate); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION: RAPE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, AND WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 26-31 (1984)
(San Francisco survey where only 9.5% of women reported their rapes); MENACHEM AMIR,
PAIERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 27-28 (1971) (estimates from 5-30% of rapes are actually
reported).
28. David Meeks, Jefferson Crime Dips Slightly Except Rapes, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), May 29, 1993, at B1; Chris Conway, '92 Major Crimes Fell in NJ, PHILADELPHIA IN-
QUIRER, July 1, 1993, at S1 (overall crimes decreased by six percent, violent crimes by one per-
cent, although number of rapes increased by six percent); Bob Mitchell, Reported Cases of Sex
Assault Jump by 40.3%, TORONTO STAR, July 8, 1993, at MS1; Frank Phillips, Mass. Crime Re-
port is Mixed, BOSTON GLOBE, May 1, 1993, at 17; Michele Parente, City Murders Rapes In-
crease, NEWSDAY, May 20, 1993, at 127.
29. S. REP. No. 545, supra note 19, at 30-31 (discussing the gender gap in assault rates,
where assaults against women have now outstripped assaults of men); Koss & HARVEY, supra
note 18, at 27-28 (While adult men can be raped, the prevalence rates vary from 0.6% to 7%.);
DOJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 7.
30. PAULINE B. BART & EILEEN GEIL MORAN, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE BLOODY
FOOTPRINTS 193-200 (1993).
31. Women and Violence, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 12 (1990).
32. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (con-
scious failure to take adequate precautions against foreseeable risk of rear end car crashes in the
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trained from their girlhood to understand this intuitively. Women live
their lives always conscious of the threat of rape and sexual violence.33
We watch for indicia of sexual danger at all times and govern many of
our actions in relation to our degree of fear and caution. Men gener-
ally are oblivious to this fear. 34 Tort law and foreseeability doctrine
must deal with the concrete reality of women's vulnerability to sexual
violence.
I would like to share a personal anecdote from my teaching to
reLnforce my c!an-.. that women and znen have very different daiiy per-
ceptions of the prevalence and reality of rape in their lives. In addi-
tion to torts, I coteach a civil rights class on power, privilege, and
law.35 As one of the exercises in the class, we ask the students to write
essays on the meaning of male privilege. Regardless of the political or
ideological leanings of our students, women students in near uniform-
ity discuss the privilege of men to live their lives free of the fear of
rape and confinements because of the fear of rape. Men, on the other
hand, rarely if ever notice this as part of their male privilege. Our
discussions in class are always quite enlightening for them. If there is
one sure thing we can say about rape in our society, it is that rape is
unfortunately very foreseeable in women's lives.
SOCIALIZING THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RAPE PREVENTION
Although my arguments here are about how tort law must be ad-
justed to take women's consciousness and the reality of rape into ac-
count in its doctrines and their application, others are working with
similar arguments in civil rights arenas. For the third year in a row,
Senator Joseph Biden has introduced the "Violence Against Women
Act" to Congress in hopes of establishing that violence against women
(sexual and physical assaults by strangers and domestic partners) is a
violation of women's civil rights and remediable through private dam-
ages actions like other kinds of civil rights violations. 36 With the
design of the Ford Pinto justified the imposition of millions of dollars of punitive damages, in
addition to millions in compensatory damages).
33. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 3 (1987); Susan Griffin, Rape: The All-American
Crime, RAMPARTS 26-35 (Sept. 1971); see generally SUSAN BROWNMiLLER, AGAINST OUR WILL:
MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1976); MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE
FEAR (1989); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S PERSPECTIVE (1977).
34. Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193, 225
(1987-88).
35. See generally, Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman, Impassioning a Civil Rights Course, 16
VT. L. REV. 943 (1992) (includes description of the course).
36. For two excellent recent notes discussing this proposed legislation, see W.H. Hallock,
Note, The Violence Against Women Act: The Civil Rights For Sexual Assault Victims, 68 IND. L.J.
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assistance and support of many other senators, women's groups, and
support staff, Senator Biden's committee has proposed that "violence
against women" be treated as the kind of harm it is-a bias crime
based on sex/gender discrimination-and as an issue of equality for
women. Physical and sexual violence against women is a social injury
affecting all women.37 A civil rights action is one way the law can try
to remedy the systemic oppression of women through fear of rape and
the consequences of the physical, sexual assaults. 38 This year the Judi-
ciary Committee of the Senate unanimously recommended passage of
this Act. 39 Hopefully the full Senate will take it up and pass it this
session. As you can guess, there is some formidable opposition to this
richer understanding of sexual assault in our law. It is very threaten-
ing to many men to understand rape as a civil rights violation because
of its pervasive nature and their sense of vulnerability to accusations.
In addition, opponents complain that federal courts will be overrun
with what should be individualized state prosecutions. 40
As lynching was a form of terrorism and assault used against Af-
rican-American men in our society, rape is a form of terrorism and
assault used against women of all races.41 In order to get at this ter-
rorism, we need more than prosecutions of the perpetrator rapists, yet
577 (1993), and Brande Stellings, Note, The Public Harm of Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrim-
ination and Citizenship, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 185 (1993). See also S. REP. No. 545, supra
note 19, at 40.
37. For interesting work discussing another aspect of the social injury of sex discrimination
and violence against women, see Adrian Howe, The Problem of Privatized Injuries: Feminist
Strategies for Litigation, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 148
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen, eds., Routledge, 1991); Joyce McCon-
nell, Incest as Conundrum: Judicial Discourse on Private Wrong and Public Harm, 1 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 143 (1992).
38. So long as rape is understood as individualized harm, it can be attributed to the inappro-
priate conduct of one man and of one woman. When the group-based nature of these assaults is
recognized in law, the legal system will also be pressed to drop myths and assumptions that have
prejudiced women, myths that attribute responsibility for rape to the women targets.
39. Penny Bender, Report Rips U.S. Rape Record, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 28, 1993, at A21
(Judiciary Committee unanimously passed Senator Biden's Violence Against Women Act, as it
did last Congress, but the act is opposed by judges and conservatives who believe it will flood the
courts with civil rights cases).
40. Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1991) (statement of Hon. Vincent L.
McKusick, President of Conference of Chief Justices).
41. Id. at 250-81 (statement of Dr. Leslie R. Wolfe, Executive Director, Center for Women
Policy Studies). For slightly different challenging descriptions of the relationship between ra-
cism, rape and terrorism, see ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS 172-201 (1983);
ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, CULTURE & POLITICS 39-52 (1984); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, "The
Mind That Burns in Each Body": Women, Rape, and Racial Violence, in RACE, CLASS, AND
GENDER 397 (Margaret L. Anderson & Patricia Hill Collins, eds., 1992); BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A
WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); Valerie Smith, Split Affinities: The Case of In-
terracial Rape, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 271 (Marianne Hirsh & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990);
Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism and Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103 (1983).
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we are failing miserably at the limited solution of prosecuting the per-
petrators. 42 The Violence Against Women Report of the Senate found
that ninety-eight percent of victims of rape never see their attacker
caught, tried and imprisoned. 43 Over half of all rape prosecutions are
either dismissed before trial or result in an acquittal, and almost one
quarter of convicted rapists never go to prison. Almost half of all con-
victed rapists can expect to serve an average of a year or less behind
bars. A robber is thirty percent more likely to be convicted than a
rapist, and a rape prosecution is thirty percent more iikeiy to be dis-
missed than a robbery conviction. A convicted rapist is fifty percent
more likely to receive probation than a convicted robber. While ef-
forts are being made to reform the criminal justice system to deal
more appropriately with rapists and protect potential rape victims,
that is not enough.
The prevalence of rape and violence against women will only
change when attitudes towards women change and women achieve
true equality. One way to make that change is to equalize our respon-
sibility for rape prevention. Until now the lion's share of rape preven-
tion has been women's responsibility, from locking doors to avoiding
dangerous places, from monitoring what we drink and how we act to
learning self-defense techniques. If we are raped, we are often
blamed or taught to blame ourselves for not taking adequate precau-
tions for our own safety,44 for being too trusting, for not fighting
back. It is not our fault, individually or collectively, that men commit
these violent, hateful, disrespectful harms to women. And it is only
partially our responsibility to protect against rape. In fact, the total
responsibility for rape prevention should be with men, since men are
the rapists and must learn to control their own behavior and atti-
tudes.45 But given the fact that we are a long way from the day when
men take full or even primary responsibility for preventing rape, it is
not too much to ask that they bear their equal share.
Tort law has made consciousness about automobile safety the re-
sponsibility of car manufacturers. Likewise, consciousness about rape
prevention should be the responsibility of all men, and of all our insti-
tutions (government, business, workplaces, housing, public transporta-
42. Fortunately, in Jane Doe's case in Tennessee, both men were convicted of rape. Yet,
that is not so typical. THE RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra note 14, at 2.
43. Id. All the statistics in this paragraph of the text are from the above cited report.
44. Of course, we are also often blamed for "provoking" the violence against ourselves by
what we wear, where we are, how we look or walk or talk.
45. See, e.g., Rus E. FUNK, STOPPING RAPE: A CHALLENGE FOR MEN (1993).
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tion and public accommodations, schools, families), and of our law
and legal system, our educational systems, health systems and the me-
dia. We can spread this responsibility by making all citizens, male and
female, legally responsible through tort damages actions for failing to
take conscious and reasonable precautions against the clearly foresee-
able risk of rape to women and by working as lawyers and judges to
take the male biases out of the perspective of tort law.46
If tort law were to incorporate women's perspectives in its appli-
cation of foreseeability doctrines, the law would never doubt the fore-
seeability of rape and the need for every person to proceed with
reasonable caution to guard against it. Women would not be held re-
sponsible or blamed for failing to protect themselves adequately, be-
cause all of us would be responsible (to the degree that we have some
control over the context) for protecting women generally from the
foreseeability of rape in that context. That the law does not inevitably
understand this exposes its maleness. To answer the question of this
panel "Is the law male?," Yes. Law is male, at least in its application,
because of its limited perspective and flawed assumptions that could
permit a state supreme court to legally conclude that a rape was not a
foreseeable consequence of a house key getting into the wrong hands.
APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL TORT CONCEPTS OF DUTY AND
FORESEEABILITY TO RAPE
We do not have to change tort doctrine to include women's per-
spectives and experiences in duty and foreseeability analysis. We only
have to change the ways in which the law is applied and interpreted.
But we must change it across the board, so no other Jane Does will
have their tort claims thrown out of court because their rapes were
unforeseeable to parties controlling access to their homes or offices. 47
Using the Restatement (Second) of Torts48 to illustrate my argu-
ment, it is clear that the principles in tort law already provide lucid
rationales for liability in this and similar cases. Section 281 states that
46. Other responsibility-spreading techniques include continuous education of men and wo-
men about mutual consent being an absolute prerequisite to sexual relations and the elimination
of rape images and pornographic images of sexualized harms to women.
47. See, e.g., Doe v. Dominion Bank, 963 F.2d 1552 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (opinion by Judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg) (finding potential liability of building manager for third party rape of woman at
her office building).
48. Clearly the Restatement is not, in and of itself, "the law." Each of the points I will make
could be made by references to cases in many states. Because the exact language of state cases
differs, although generally the gist or core of the conceptual analysis is similar, the Restatement is
the most useful, generally recognized national authority on what the law is. The annotations to
the Restatement sections give references to useful state cases that utilize that particular section's
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an actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another if that inva-
sion has caused harm, and if his or her conduct is negligent "with re-
spect to the other, or a class of persons within which [the other] is
included. '49 Comment e to that section discusses the nature of the
risk of harm and specifically notes that the failure to lock a door may
be negligent and result in liability precisely because a criminal may
come in.50 Following the Restatement's logic, mishandling of keys to
inhabited residences may be negligent and result in liability precisely
because it creates a risk that potential rapists will use the keys to enter
the homes of women and rape them. It is a harm to the class of fe-
males and to the specific woman who ends up being raped.
An act is only negligent when done without reasonable care.51
Comment a to section 298 explains that "'care' denotes not only the
attention which is necessary to perceive danger, but also the caution
required to avert it once it is perceived." Comment b to the same
section explains that
the greater the danger, the greater the care which must be exercised
.... The amount of attention and caution required varies with the
magnitude of the harm likely to be done if care is not exercised, and
with the utility of the act .... [I]f the act involves a risk of death or
serious bodily harm .... the highest attention and caution are re-
quired, even if the act has a very considerable utility.
Applying this reasoning to the instant case, since sexual and physical
assaults are very great and may result in serious bodily harms, reason-
able care includes "the highest attention and caution" to perceive
these dangers from an actor's handling of the key. But since the mis-
handling of the key itself does not directly involve an unreasonable
risk of harm, but creates the risk that another person will cause harm,
one may argue that it is not negligent.
The Restatement clearly addresses this concern in section 302
where it states "a negligent act or omission may be one which involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to another through ... (b) the foresee-
analysis. I could also create the same arguments using any of the major treatises. See, e.g., W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(b) (1965).
50. Id. Comment e reads in part:
Thus in some situations the locking of a securely closed door may be required only for
the purpose of protecting goods within the room or building from the risk of theft [or
people from the risk of physical assault]. When the thief [burglar/rapist] appears on the
scene, opens the unlocked door, and steals the goods within [commits physical assaults],
the harm which results is the precise harm which the duty to lock the door was designed
to prevent.
(parallel language added in brackets).
51. Id. § 298.
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able action of... a third person .... ,"52 What actions of third persons
are foreseeable? Comment j to section 302 explains that actors are
"required to know the common qualities and habits of other human
beings . . . which a reasonable [person] in the actor's position would
anticipate and guard against. ' 53 Although the language of the com-
ment actually says reasonable man, I have substituted the more appro-
priate, gender-neutral term, reasonable person. Recognizing that
reasonable persons include women leads to the conclusion that the
section comment means that women's perceptions and understandings
of the common qualities and habits of human beings must be guarded
against and anticipated. By incorporating knowledge about the perva-
siveness of rape and violence against women in our society, courts
would be compelled to find as a matter of law that there is a duty to
act to prevent the unreasonable risk of rapes by third persons.
The Restatement could not be more explicit in its coverage of the
case at hand. Section 302B explains that an act or omission may be
negligent because it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another
by a third person's intentional conduct, even though such conduct is
criminal. The subsequent comments to section 302B note that ordina-
rily one need not assume someone will violate a criminal law, but
there are circumstances where liability attaches to the original negli-
gent actor for a third party's criminally caused harms to a plaintiff.
The comment and illustration in this section again parallel the circum-
stances of the Doe case by noting that liability attaches "[w]here the
actor's affirmative act is intended or likely to defeat a protection
which the other has placed around his [sic] person or property for the
purpose of guarding them from intentional interference. ' 54 Applying
this to Doe, defendants' handling of plaintiff's key defeated plaintiff's
protection of locking her door against intruders. So, even without ap-
plying rules about assuming a duty to aid or protect another 55 or the
trend in law to impose affirmative duties on landlords to provide ade-
quate security for their tenants, traditional tort law concepts expressly
illustrate that a property manager has a duty of reasonable care in
handling a key controlling entrance to a residence in order to prevent
rapes by third parties. If reasonable care is not exercised in light of
the gravity of the risk, then juries can find the key handling conduct
52. Id. § 302.
53. Id. § 302 cmt. j.
54. Id. § 302B cmt. c. Illustration 6 gives an example of a mishandled key and liability of
the key mishandler (A) to the victim of a theft by a third party (B).
55. See id. §§ 314-324A.
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negligent. But negligent conduct alone is not enough to impose liabil-
ity. The negligent conduct must be a factual and legal cause of the
injury.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The Restatement language on causation reinforces Justice
Daughtrey's conclusion that this case should have gone to a jury. Sec-
tion 435(1) states: "If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw
nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in
which it occurred does not prevent him [sic] from being liable."' 56 The
majority in Doe relied upon the fact that the defendants could not
have foreseen that
the painter-wallpaper hanger would steal a key to a building which
later would become the sales office, that he would use that key in
order to steal a key to one of the completed residences, and that he
would use the second key to commit a criminal assault on the occu-
pant. There is no precedent or responsible authority which requires
the builder-seller, under the circumstances of this case to foresee a
crime upon a crime upon a crime.57
But that is not a fair interpretation of the settled law about proximate
cause. Defendants would not be required to foresee the exact se-
quence of events, but to foresee that a rape might occur from an un-
lawful entry into the residence using the mishandled key. As section
435 stresses, the "manner in which it occurred does not prevent him
from being liable." s58 Section 442A explains that where the actor's
negligent conduct (key mishandling) created or increased the foresee-
able risk of harm from an intervening force (rape by third person),
that intervening force is not superseding and does not cut off the origi-
nal actor's liability.59 Comment b to section 442A is particularly
telling:
Where the negligence of the actor has created the risk of harm to
another because of the likelihood of such intervention, the actor is
not relieved of responsibility merely because the risk which he has
created has in fact been fulfilled. The same is true where there is
already some existing risk or possibility of the intervention, but the
negligence of the actor has increased the risk of such intervention or
of the harm if it occurs. 6°
56. Id. § 435(1).
57. Doe, 845 S.W.2d at 181.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435.
59. Id. § 442A.
60. Id. § 442A cmt. b.
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Although intentional or criminal conduct by third persons often severs
the original negligent actor's liability, "such tortious or criminal acts
may in themselves be foreseeable, and so within the scope of the cre-
ated risk, in which case the actor may still be liable for the harm,
under the rules stated in sections 448 and 449."61
The Restatement directly tackles causation issues in cases of inter-
vening third party criminal acts in sections 448 and 449. Section 448
states that although the negligence of an actor creates an opportunity
for a third person to commit a crime, liability will not attach for the
resulting harm, "unless the actor at the time of [the] negligent conduct
realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation
might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the
opportunity to commit such a tort or crime. '' 62 Even more to the
point, section 449 reads, "If the likelihood that a third person may act
in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which
makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent,
intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from be-
ing liable for harm caused thereby. '63 Comment b to this section rea-
sons that
The happening of the very event the likelihood of which makes the
actor's conduct negligent and so subjects the actor to liability cannot
relieve him from liability. The duty to refrain from the act commit-
ted or to do the act omitted is imposed to protect the other from
this very danger. To deny recovery because the other's exposure to
the very risk from which it was the purpose of the duty to protect
him resulted in harm to him, would be to deprive the other of all
protection and to make the duty a nullity.64
To emphasize the applicability of this reasoning to a case similar to
Doe's, comment c to the same section notes that
there are many precautions, such as locking a door .... which are
designed to protect the chattels [or people] contained in the build-
ing or room from theft [or rape and physical assault]. The fact that
the thief's [or rapist's] act in taking advantage of the opportunity is
61. Id. § 442B cmt. c.
62. Id. § 448. See particularly comment c:
The actor's conduct may be negligent solely because he should have recognized that it
would expose the person, land, or chattels, of another to an unreasonable risk of crimi-
nal aggression. If so, it necessarily follows that the fact that the harm is done by such
criminal aggression cannot relieve the actor from liability (see § 449). However, it is
not necessary that the conduct should be negligent solely because of its tendency to
afford an opportunity for a third person to commit the crime. It is enough that the
actor should have realized the likelihood that his conduct would create a temptation
which would be likely to lead to its commission.
63. Id. § 449.
64. Id. § 449 cmt. b.
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criminal does not make it a superseding cause of the loss of the
stolen chattels [or the harm].65
When read together, these sections and comments of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts ineluctably lead to a conclusion (at the very least!)
that reasonable minds could differ about the proximate cause issue,
and it should go to a jury for determination. It could be argued that
they lead to the even stronger conclusion that if the facts show that
the key was mishandled, and the mishandled key came into the pos-
session of a criminal party, the mishandling will be considered the
proximate cause of the later criminal intervention.
The Tennessee Supreme Court was quite familiar with these sec-
tions that I cite, having used them in McClenahan. I tend to believe
that the court would have been more sympathetic to a complaint by
elderly tenants that mishandling of their house key by the manage-
ment office allowed Carpenter to enter their home and steal their
property or beat them up. The only difference between that hypothet-
ical case and Jane Doe's case is the kind of harm. If burglary and theft
are foreseeable according to the Restatement and case law, what could
there be about rape that makes it unforeseeable, except biased misun-
derstandings of its frequency and sources? Feminist analysis enables
us to expose the male perspective and fallacious assumptions in the
application of traditional tort doctrine of foreseeability, proximate
cause, and intervening causes to the Doe case with the ultimate goal of
correcting law's deficiencies and moving ever closer to justice and
fairness.
NOTICE ISSUE
I hope I have illustrated how the court's application of tort law
doctrines of foreseeability, duty, and causation was skewed by male
bias in the Doe case. Now I will give one example of how the doctrine
itself, on its face, rather than in its application, is biased. For this ar-
gument, I will use the Doe majority's requirement that a property
manager have knowledge of prior crimes at the housing complex
before a duty to protect or guard against criminal activity arises. 66 I
call this the "site-specific notice" requirement.
I imagine now that the majority in Doe might concede the fore-
seeability of rape, but then they would argue that just because some-
65. Id. § 449 cmt. c. (bracketed words added to make language of comment c parallel to the
Doe case facts).
66. Doe, 845 S.W.2d at 184.
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thing is foreseeable in the abstract, it is not necessarily foreseeable in
a particular context. In cases of premises liability law, the Doe major-
ity required that property owners or managers have "notice" of prior
similar incidents of criminal activity in the property area or on the site,
before they have a duty to protect against it or before the property
manager's acts or omissions will be considered causally connected to
the harms from third party criminal activities.67 Most courts say that
foreseeability applies if owners have notice of some criminal activity
at the site, but prior occurrences of the specific crime are not re-
quired. 68 Perhaps the Idaho Supreme Court expressed the rationale
for this rule best in Sharp v. W.H. Moore where it stated, "There is no
'one free rape' rule in Idaho. '69 The Missouri Supreme Court also
observed that "if a burglar may enter, so may a rapist. ' 70 A Florida
appeals court went even further in stating:
We are not willing to give the landlord one free ride, as it were, and
sacrifice the first victim's right to safety upon the altar of foresee-
ability by slavishly adhering to the now-discredited notion that at
least one criminal assault must have occurred on the premises
before the landlord can be held liable.71
By citing evidence of other unauthorized entries in homes in
Doe's community, Justice Daughtrey demonstrates that there was no-
tice under this "site-specific, prior incidences" rule. She argues that
any evidence of unauthorized entry necessarily increases the foresee-
ability of rape. Yet the majority again rejected this approach, dis-
missing this evidence of break-ins as inconsequential. Even assuming
that the reported unauthorized entries occurred, the court thought
67. "We hold that if the owner is to be held liable for the sudden criminal acts of third
persons there must be a showing that the owner was on notice in some manner of the imminent
probability of the act. Otherwise, there can be no issue for jury determination." Doe, 845
S.W.2d at 184 (citing Corbitt v. Ringley-Crockett, 496 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973); see also
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
68. See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 695 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1985); Paterson v. Deeb,
472 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506 (Idaho 1990);
Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358 (Ill. 1988); Sharpe v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, 519
N.E.2d 134 (Mass. 1988); Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1988); Small v. McKennan
Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194 (S.D. 1989). New York's highest court recently ruled that "[t]here is no
requirement ... that the past experience relied on to establish foreseeability be of criminal
activity at the exact location where plaintiff was harmed or that it be of the same type of criminal
conduct to which plaintiff was subjected." Jacqueline S. v. City of N.Y., 614 N.E.2d 723, 726
(N.Y. 1993); see generally, David W. Robertson, Negligence Liability for Crimes and Intentional
Torts Committed by Others, 67 TUL. L. REV. 135 (1992); Gary Spivey, Annotation, Landlord's
Obligation to Protect Tenant Against Criminal Activities of Third Persons, 43 A.L.R. 3D 331
(1972); B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Torts, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing Lia-
bility on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679 (1992).
69. Sharp, 796 P.2d at 510.
70. Aaron, 758 S.W.2d at 448.
71. Paterson, 472 So. 2d at 1218-19.
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that because they were so minor and did not involve physical assault,
they would not afford notice of possible risks of rape.72
Here is another place that progressive lawyers can intervene in
the male-biased reasoning of courts. There are two points I would
like to make: (1) that in cases of rape and sexual assault, site-specific
notice of criminal activity should never be required for a woman's resi-
dence; and (2) that if site-specific notice is needed, Justice
Daughtrey's argument about any unauthorized entries being sufficient
notice should win the day.
The requirement that property managers have site-specific notice
of criminal activity before a duty arises to protect against it is based on
an assumption that the foreseeability of certain kinds of crimes differs
in different localities. While I am not sure whether this assumption
makes sense even for notice of other crimes at the site, it is clearly
inappropriate for rape. Rape happens everywhere that women are.73
Contrary to popular myths that most rapes are by strangers and occur
at night in specifically dangerous, badly lit, or lonely locations, most
women are raped by non-strangers (men they know or who know
them) in places that those women live and work.74 Women are raped
by strangers in dark, isolated locations, but that is not half of the dan-
ger to women from rape. The male bias of law permits the perpetua-
tion of myths about rape despite clear sociological evidence to the
contrary.75 The evidence repeatedly shows that women are raped
more often by people they know than by strangers, more often in
72. After ruling that a decision in which "such tenuous circumstances may constitute notice
that produces foreseeability and therefore duty would truly 'revolutionize' the law of negli-
gence," Justice Reid concludes, "Finding circumstances such as minor thefts, unexplained use of
a bathroom, and unsubstantiated rumors to be sufficient notice on which to base liability for
subsequent criminal assaults is not the law in Tennessee or any other jurisdiction." Doe, 845
S.W.2d at 180.
73. See Schafran, supra note 15 (explaining and debunking myths about rape).
74. DOJ REPORT, supra note 15, at 7 (Bureau of Justice statistics recite that only 18% of
rapes happen on the street, and, as I noted earlier, those statistics understate nonstranger
rapes.); RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 17, at 5 (75% of rapes are
nonstranger rapes). The continued vitality of these myths serves goals of sexist oppression. Wo-
men are much easier to "control" if they are fearful of going out alone or with other women at
night. Also, the idea of stranger rape as the predominant form of criminal sexual abuse enables
dominating men to distance themselves and their conduct from that criminality. They can be-
lieve that rapists only rape strangers. Therefore, if men only force sex upon women with whom
they are acquainted, then they do not need to understand themselves as rapists or potential
rapists.
75. See A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA, supra note 17; Morrison Torrey, When Will We




homes than out of them.76 Women are raped at all times of day and
night and at all ages, whether young girls or elders. 77 Women are
raped by friends, husbands and lovers, male relatives, neighbors, em-
ployers and co-employees, professors, clergymen, dates and acquaint-
ances, and repairmen, as in this case. The Doe majority stresses
several times that this was a nonstranger rape, as if that were a legiti-
mate ground for distinguishing this case from others finding premises
liability.78 Somehow the fact that the management knew the rapist
made the rape less foreseeable to the court. This is not consistent with
contemporary understandings of rape. Rapists are not usually lurking
psychopaths or sex-starved individuals, but people with whom we all
deal on a daily basis.79
Since women are vulnerable to male violence and forced sexual-
ity in all environments, especially their own homes, and by people we
all know, the law cannot require "notice" of prior rapes or lurking
strangers in the building, neighborhood, or area as a precondition to
foreseeability, duty, causation, and liability. A feminist lawyer should
argue that every property manager, or anyone responsible for the se-
curity of a woman's residence or workplace, must be considered to
have notice-whether actual or constructive-of the foreseeability of
rape in that location by any male there. Notice does not mean that
76. A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA, supra note 17, at 27-28; THE RESPONSE TO RAPE,
supra note 14, at 21; Schafran, supra note 15, at 985-86 (concluding that approximately 80% of
rapes are committed by someone known to the victim, citing Massachusetts Department of Pub-
lic Health data that only 18% of sexual assaults reported to rape crisis centers involve strangers
and a Minnesota Program for Victims of Sexual Assault report finding only 10% of reported
sexual assaults were by strangers). See generally, ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME
(Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991); ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE
(1988); Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217 (1989); Beverly Balos &
Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger Rape, 75 MINN. L. REV. 599
(1991); Steven I. Friedland, Date Rape and the Culture of Acceptance, 43 FLA. L. REV. 487
(1991); Ian T. Bownes et al., Rape-A Comparison of Stranger and Acquaintance Assaults, 31
MED., SCI. & L. 102 (1991).
77. Schafran, supra note 15, at 993-94.
78. "A significant difference between those cases [imposing duties to protect against third
party criminal activity] and the present case is that in the present case, the criminal tortfeasor is
not a 'stranger' to the defendants but a person who was authorized by contract to be on the
premises .... " Doe, 845 S.W.2d at 177. "The key was not taken by a 'dangerous character' or
one engaged in 'criminal activity.' In fact it was taken ... by a contract painter-paper hanger
who lawfully was working on the premises .... " Id. at 179. "It is important to emphasize again
that the tortfeasor in this case was not a stranger to the defendants." Id. at 182.
79. Schafran, supra note 15, at 1001-03; A. Nicholas Groth & William F. Hobson, The Dy-
namics of Sexual Assault, in SEXUAL DYNAMICS OF ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 161 (Louis B.
Schlesinger & Eugene Revitch eds., 1983); DIANA SCULLY, UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE
(1990); Eugene Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial Victims and Criminals, 9 VICrIMOLOGY 95 (1984).
By thinking of rape as violent sexual aggression against a total stranger, most people can
think of rapists as mentally unstable, rather than the guy next door. JOYCE E. WILLIAMS &
KAREN A. HOLMES, THE SECOND ASSAULT-. RAPE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES 136, tbl 18 (1981).
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property managers would be responsible for every rape, but their con-
duct would be evaluated in light of the real risk of rape in women's
lives and the matters over which the property managers have some
control. There would be no place in law to argue the absence of no-
tice about the foreseeability of rape at a woman's residence or work-
place. If lawyers fail to present these arguments, courts ought to take
judicial notice of the facts about the prevalence of rape and who rap-
ists often are.
am not arguing that every property owner must become a pri-
vate police officer to protect against rape,80 but that a determination
about whether reasonable care to guard against rape of women resi-
dents with respect to matters within their control was exercised, and
what is reasonable under all the circumstances, must rest on the real-
ity of rape in women's lives. Tort doctrine as espoused and applied
must progress beyond its biased, male orientation. Since women are
especially vulnerable to rape in their own homes, at a minimum tort
law should demand that we control who has access. If, as in the Doe
case, access to a woman's residence is left in someone else's hands,
there should never be a question about the foreseeability of rape or
notice. That the location or site is her home gives specific notice of
the foreseeability of rape. The only question in an unbiased tort law
would be the one that goes to a jury-whether the property manager's
conduct that enabled someone to get access to the woman's residence
was below the standard of care given the foreseeability of rape.
Again, my argument here is not that all property managers must
take affirmative steps to protect all women residents from rapes by all
the people they know. That would not be feasible. They can, how-
ever, be required by tort law to protect women residents from rapes
by people they know or don't know by using reasonable care to guard
against rape, when aspects of a woman's safety are within their con-
trol-such as key management. Tort law must impose an enforceable
obligation on those in control of aspects of a woman's safety to use
reasonable care to protect her from potential rapes by known and un-
known parties.
My second argument on the notice issue is brief. The majority
argues that the series of unauthorized break-ins reported were incon-
sequential and minor, never having caused any real loss or injury. Jus-
tice Daughtrey counters in her dissent that once the break-ins
80. Contra, Glesner, supra note 68, at 679 (who hears arguments like mine as requirements
for landlords to be cops).
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evidence a risk, the need to act is clear, and the expected damages
from those break-ins dictate how much the property manager is called
upon to do, not whether s/he must act in the first instance. In Doe, the
management was not being required to add locks, security systems,
guards, or extra lighting in response to the reported unauthorized
break-ins. They had already installed deadbolt locks for the safety of
their residents. Justice Daughtrey's own words make the last step in
this argument better than I can:
But a deadbolt lock is only as good as the key to it is secure. Obvi-
ously, if the key to a lock falls into the wrong hands, the security of
the residence itself is compromised.
Hence, when the question is one of wrongful use of a housekey,
even a relatively minor breach of security takes on major signifi-
cance, because it demonstrates the fact that the lock (and therefore
the residence) is not secure. Clearly then, it does not take a rape or
robbery to trigger the duty of one in possession of a passkey or du-
plicate key to investigate instances of unauthorized entry and to
take adequate precautions against future breaches of security. Even
incidents as minor as those reported in this case-use of a toilet or
theft of a can of tuna fish-are sufficient to put those in control of
the keys on notice that some reasonable response on their part is
required. When no response is forthcoming and an injury results
from the very risk that the person in control should have taken steps
to avoid, it is clear that the person guilty of failing to take action
should pay for the damages, and not the injured plaintiff.81
Even if "site-specific, prior occurrences" notice is required, the evi-
dence of the slightest breach of security by use of a passkey would
meet the test.
CONCLUSION
Using one case as the central focal point of analysis, I have illus-
trated how tort law is male in its application and on its face or at its
core regarding premises liability for third party rapes. By failing to
understand the lived reality of rape in women's lives, tort law has al-
lowed it to be legally coherent to rule, as the Doe majority did, that
rape was an unforeseeable consequence of key mishandling. If some-
thing is factually incoherent from women's experiences and under-
standings, then it must also be legally incoherent.
My relatively simplistic feminist analysis in this article reveals
how male bias has paraded as neutrality and how women's perspec-
tives and experiences have been left out of doctrinal development and
81. Doe, 845 S.W.2d at 194-95 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
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law application in the tort area. We have a responsibility to inform
ourselves and our courts about women's lives and needs, about ways
in which women's perspectives have been ignored or marginalized in
law, and about ways that legal doctrines and concepts need to be
changed. Feminist legal theories offer many more critical perspectives
on even this narrow area of tort law than I have shared in this article.
With more time and space, I could argue how traditional tort law as-
sumptions that property managers have no duty to protect residents
were rooted in male-biased understandings of relationships, responsi-
bilities, and values. The different approaches of the majority and dis-
sent in some ways turned on their construction of the issue as one of
misfeasance or nonfeasance, concepts which I have argued elsewhere
seem rooted in alternative conceptions of human nature and human
connection.82 Feminists could expose more ways in which the narra-
tive styles used to report the facts can be male-biased and influence
decisions. And there is much more.
I encourage all practitioners and judges to learn feminist method-
ology for critiquing law and demonstrating its biases. With knowledge
of women's experiences and perspectives and the application of femi-
nist methodology, we will be better able to educate judges, attorneys,
juries, law professors, law students, and the public about ways in
which male bias has undermined the fairness of law and created barri-
ers to justice for women.
82. Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 575
(1993); Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts On the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power,
and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848; Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25
TULSA L. J. 759 (1990); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J.




[Note: The following is the statement of facts excerpted from Justice
Daughtrey's dissenting opinion in Doe v. Linder Constr. Co., 845
S.W.2d 173, 187-90 (Tenn. 1992).]
Factual Background
In this case, it is undisputed, for example, that the plaintiff was
raped by two men, who surreptitiously entered the home where she
and her four-year-old son were sleeping on the night of October 9,
1986. After assaulting Doe, one of the men stole several pieces of
jewelry from her bedroom and then helped himself to food from her
refrigerator while the second rape was being committed.
Doe recognized her assailants because she had seen both of them
working in Idlewild Court, the residential development where she
lived. Based upon her identification, Sam Carpenter and Clinton Os-
borne were arrested the next day; they were eventually convicted of
rape and imprisoned. Doe then brought this suit for damages against
the developer, the construction company, the realty company, and
their agents, after the police investigation revealed that Sam Carpen-
ter and Clinton Osborne had gained entrance to her house by use of a
duplicate key that had been in the defendants' possession. One of
those defendants is Elwood Carpenter, Sam Carpenter's father, who
was the on-site superintendent at Idlewild Court and who hired his
son to do painting and wallpapering there.
Doe had purchased her house, one of approximately 30 in a new
"planned unit development" in Madison, Tennessee, in the summer of
1985. When she was first shown the house by real estate agent Pattie
Rollins, it was unfinished. In her sales pitch, Rollins mentioned vari-
ous selling points about Idlewild Court, including "good security." An
advertising sheet for the development emphasized the fact that the
outside doors to the units were secured by dead-bolt locks. Doe testi-
fied by deposition that one reason she decided to buy a house at
Idlewild Court was that it appeared to be a safe place to raise her
young son.
When Doe moved in the day after the closing on August 23, 1985,
there were still two or three "unsolved problems" inside the house-
the painter had missed covering a small area in the kitchen, and there
was a tear in the wallpaper in one bathroom and a problem with the
wallpaper seams in a second bathroom. At the closing, Rollins as-
sured Doe that all necessary repairs would be made. As Doe later
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remembered the conversation, Rollins told her that Elwood Carpen-
ter, the on-site supervisor, "had a master key to the homes" and
would take care of these matters for her. They were put on what is
known in the real estate trade as a "punch list." A few days after
moving in, Doe discovered minor leaks in the plumbing and that prob-
lem, too, was added to the punch list. Later, she requested that a vent
for a new clothes dryer be installed. All the items on the punch list
but one were taken care of shortly after the closing.
As Elwood Carpenter explained in his deposition, the "master
key" to the houses in the development was operable only until a key
specifically made for a given lock was used in that lock, at which time
the lock automatically rekeyed itself and would no longer accept the
master key. Hence, in order to make inside repairs on a resident's
punch list, it was necessary to have access to a key specifically made
for that particular house. Pattie Rollins testified that her usual proce-
dure was to retain a key from the set of keys that was turned over to a
new owner at the closing. Some residents knew that she had retained
a key, she testified, but others did not. Rollins further testified that
she did not recall the exact circumstances under which she had given
Jane Doe her set of house keys. In Doe's deposition, however, she
repeatedly refers to Elwood Carpenter's possession of a "master key,"
leaving the impression that she did not know that Rollins had retained
a duplicate key to her home.
In any event, the painting and plumbing problems in Jane Doe's
unit were cleared up a short time after she moved in. However, a
lengthy dispute arose over the condition of the wallpaper in one of the
bathrooms, and more than a year after Doe moved in, the matter had
still not been resolved. Pattie Rollins apparently took the position
that the wallpaper had been successfully patched; Jane Doe was dis-
satisfied and wanted the wallpaper completely replaced.
Despite the fact that she considered all the problems on the Doe
punch list resolved, Rollins continued to retain the duplicate key to
Doe's home. She had tagged it with Doe's lot number and kept it with
other keys to units in Idlewild Court that had been similarly retained.
They were stored in what Elwood Carpenter later referred to as a
"plastic tray." Another witness described it as a plastic box with "see-
through drawers." By all accounts, this plastic box was not only kept
unlocked but had no locking mechanism on it. It was routinely stored
in the closet of the front bedroom of the Idlewild Court unit that
served as the "model home" for the development. Pattie Rollins used
the bedroom as her office. Sometimes the key box was left on the
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floor of the closet, and sometimes on the top shelf. Rollins conceded
that the closet itself was never locked.
Rollins did assert that the model home was routinely kept locked
up and secure. But her own testimony, as well as that of Elwood Car-
penter and Sam Carpenter, leaves that assertion open to dispute. Rol-
lins testified that in addition to her model home key, other sales
agents working for the realty company had keys to the unit, as did
Elwood Carpenter. The model home was visited regularly by outside
sales agents and by prospective customers.
Moreover, the construction workers at the development came in
and out of the model home to get supplies, make phone calls, and use
the bathroom. In his original deposition, Elwood Carpenter admitted
that he knew that his son, Sam, had a key to the model home. Ac-
cording to Pattie Rollins's testimony, Sam Carpenter was not author-
ized to have a key to the model home. Nevertheless, Sam himself
testified that he regularly kept beer and food in the refrigerator at the
model home, for consumption when he worked at Idlewild Court after
hours and on weekends. Although Rollins denied knowing that the
workmen made routine use of the model home, the fact that someone
was using the kitchen in this fashion could scarcely have escaped her
attention.
The defendants argue on appeal that Sam Carpenter's access to
the model home (and thus his access to the key to Jane Doe's house)
was the result of an intervening criminal act-his own, in stealing a
key to the model unit sometime prior to October 1986. Sam Carpen-
ter admitted taking one of several keys provided for locks to the
model home, after the "trim kit" containing the keys and locks was
left lying in the fireplace by the distributor while the model home was
under construction and before the locks were installed in the doors.
The theft of this key should have been noted months before the rapes
occurred, at the time the locks were installed. But even if no one no-
ticed the fact that a key was missing at that time, and thus took no
action to account for it, Sam Carpenter's theft of the key is largely
immaterial, because of his unimpeded access to the "key box" by
means other than the stolen key. For example, he had painted the
inside of the model home and could have taken the unsecured key to
Jane Doe's house while he was in the model home for this purpose.
Moreover, on the night that he allegedly stole the key to the Doe resi-
dence, he was in the model home after hours on two separate occa-
sions, as indicated below. On one of those two occasions, the unit was
unlocked, and he was able to enter without using his own key.
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Finally, it is important to note that Elwood Carpenter knew that
his son had possession of a key to the model home during the period
in question but did nothing to stop him from using it. A jury could
reasonably assume from Sam Carpenter's uninterrupted use of this
key that it was the product of acquiescence, if not out-right
authorization.
In fact, Elwood Carpenter did nothing to stop Sam Carpenter's
access to the model home and its contents, even though he knew that
his son "had a drinking problem" and had seen Sam use marijuana.
More importantly, Elwood Carpenter took no action when, during the
week immediately before the rapes occurred, Clinton Osborne
showed up on the construction site.
Osborne was well-known to Elwood Carpenter because he was
the nephew of Carpenter's ex-wife. Carpenter also knew that Os-
borne had "been in trouble with the law" in Ohio and had spent eight
or nine years in prison-as he recalled, for assault and arson. In fact,
Osborne had apparently been most recently incarcerated following his
conviction for armed robbery and was a fugitive from justice at the
time he came to Tennessee, a fact which a superficial inquiry by El-
wood Carpenter would have disclosed. In his deposition, Elwood
Carpenter tried to minimize Osborne's involvement by denying that
Osborne had been hired to work at Idlewild Court. According to El-
wood Carpenter, Osborne was just "loafing around the project with
Sam while Sam was working." But Carpenter was forced to admit
that he had seen Osborne with a paintbrush in his hand and knew that
Osborne had been "inside of the houses" during the week in question.
Elwood Carpenter testified that he was leery of Osborne and told Sam
to "get him away from the job site." But he made no effort to eject
Osborne from the premises himself, or to warn residents that a dan-
gerous person was in the area.
The most significant indication that Sam Carpenter's theft of the
model home key is simply irrelevant to the question of negligence in
this case comes from evidence in the record about the events sur-
rounding his possession of the key to Jane Doe's house on October 6,
1986, the evening of the rapes. According to Sam Carpenter's testi-
mony, he and Clinton Osborne had worked together at Idlewild Court
that day, drinking beer and "smoking dope" off and on during work-
ing hours. After they quit late in the afternoon, they went to the con-
struction trailer, where they continued to drink beer. There they also
discussed Clinton Osborne's proposal to get into Jane Doe's house for
purposes of having sex with her. At some point, Sam Carpenter broke
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off the discussion and walked over to the model home to get some
cheese and crackers he had stored there. When he arrived, he found
the house unlocked and a real estate agent standing outside, waiting
to show the model home to prospective buyers. The agent was appar-
ently not a Linder employee, because Sam Carpenter had never seen
him before. Carpenter went inside the house, without using his key,
and retrieved his cheese and crackers from the kitchen. Although he
did not take the key to the Doe home from the unsecured closet at
that time, the significant point is that he could have. Instead, he re-
turned to the construction trailer with the food, continued making
plans with Clinton Osborne for later that evening, and ultimately re-
turned to the model home to get the marked key to Jane Doe's house,
using his own key to enter the model home.
Sam Carpenter was subsequently asked, "If there [had not been]
a key in the box that night, what did you plan to do?" Referring to
Jane Doe, he responded, chillingly, "She'd have probably been safe."
This testimony raises serious questions about how and why the home-
owners' keys were retained, as well as questions about the lack of any
security measures with regard to those keys. A jury might well con-
clude, for instance, that the key to Jane Doe's house had been re-
tained in Pattie Rollins's office long after there was any legitimate
reason to keep it. Moreover, that key, like others, was kept in an un-
locked plastic box, in an unlocked closet, in a house to which many
unauthorized persons (including outside sales agents and prospective
buyers) had access. In its current state, the record fails to show that
there was any company policy about use of the keys, or any precau-
tions taken to secure them. According to Pattie Rollins, there was no
list of whose keys were kept in the box, no sign- out sheet to indicate
who might have had possession of them (and thus an opportunity to
make a copy), no regular inventory of any kind, and no policy that
they be returned to their owners as soon as possible under the circum-
stances. As to unsold homes or those still under construction, such a
lackadaisical method (or lack of method) of operation posed no im-
mediate risk of personal harm. But as to occupied residences, this
conduct clearly raises a jury question on the issue of the defendants'
breach of duty to use reasonable care in the handling of Jane Doe's
key.
Moreover, the defendants had been put on notice that unauthor-
ized entries had been made into several occupied residences at
Idlewild Court, under circumstances that suggested unauthorized use
of a key. One resident, a man named John Myers, had allegedly com-
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plained to Elwood Carpenter, Pattie Rollins, and Robert Linder that
someone had been in his home on more than one occasion, without
his permission; he was sure of this, he told Jane Doe, because "things
[had been] rearranged or the commode had not been flushed when he
felt like he didn't leave it in that shape." One couple had reported
food missing from their home. Elwood Carpenter admitted that an-
other resident, Randy Hutchison, was so upset when he learned that
Carpenter had possession of a duplicate key to his home, that he de-
manded that it be handed over immediately and thereafter stayed
home from work when repairs to the inside of his home had to be
made. Finally, Elwood Carpenter conceded that still another occu-
pied residence had been "burglarized" without any sign of forced en-
try. Various items were stolen from the house, and the matter was
reported to the police. Even under these circumstances, Pattie Rollins
took no steps to inventory or secure the keys in the model home. In-
deed, when Jane Doe expressed some concern to Rollins after she un-
expectedly saw Elwood Carpenter coming out of her house as she
arrived home one evening, Rollins told Doe "not to worry about it,
[that] he was bonded."
There is a dispute between the parties concerning the timing of
these events, i.e., whether the other unauthorized entries occurred
before or after the unauthorized use of a key to Jane Doe's house that
led to her rape, and thus whether defendants had been put on notice
that a breach of security had occurred. But viewed in a light most
favorable to Jane Doe's theory of the case, this evidence clearly
presents a question for the jury on the issue of the defendants' breach
of duty in failing to take appropriate action in response to a known
risk.
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